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A B S T R A C T   
Our research on the operation of legal institutions related to the restriction of the legal capacity of adults 
(custodianship and supported decision-making) started in December 2019. Our present analysis of case law on 
custodianship and supported decision-making is based on cases published in the Collection of Court Decisions. 
The adoption of the new Hungarian Civil Code has clearly had a significant effect on the court decisions, as it 
made it compulsory to designate the categories of decisions to which a partial restriction on legal capacity ap-
plies. However, the change in regulation also implies a change of attitude that is considerably less apparent in the 
cases. In the context of international human rights expectations, any limitation of legal capacity should be 
applied as circumspectly as possible, and only in the most necessary cases. In the examined cases, the efforts of 
the Curia (the Hungarian Supreme Court) to reinforce this change of attitude in court practice may be detected 
but they are not extensive. At the same time, the spirit of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) is not clearly reflected in court practice, and supported decision-making is not seen by courts 
as a real alternative to custodianship. Regarding the processes of the analyzed disputes, we found that the 
procedures in the published cases are relatively short, the higher courts in most cases upholding the decision of 
the lower courts, and that there is no legal or critical evaluation of any expert opinion. In a number of cases, the 
dominant function of custodianship is not the protection but the restriction of the rights of the given person and - 
against its declared goal - it serves to protect the interest of others. For example, property issues and the pro-
tection of the financial interests of family members are given priority in the published cases. In addition, there 
were several cases in which the authorities themselves sought to be ‘protected’ by limiting the capacity of the 
person to initiate official and judicial proceedings.   
1. Introduction 
Our research on the operation of legal institutions related to the re-
striction of the legal capacity of adults in Hungary started in December 
2019. In addition to custodianship, we also consider supported decision- 
making to be a significant topic for research, as no comprehensive 
research has been conducted on it in Hungary since it was introduced in 
2014. As for the operation of custodianship, apart from a small amount 
of macro-statistical data, we also have little empirical knowledge of the 
day-to-day operation of this legal institution. 
We use the term ‘custodianship’ regarding our research about the 
Hungarian legal system because this is the official translation of this 
legal institution in Hungary, but this term includes the same substitute 
decision-making mechanism for adults with limited legal capacity that is 
known in the international literature as ‘guardianship’. 
In Hungary, the current civil law regulations declare two degrees of 
the legal institution of guardianship/custodianship system, which is 
accompanied by the restrictions of legal capacity: plenary and partially 
limited guardianship of the legal capacity. The introduction of sup-
ported decision-making in Hungary has opened a new way, an alterna-
tive which supports practicing of legal capacity by appointing a 
supporting person, so in these cases, there can be no restriction of rights. 
One can see at first sight that this regulation does not comply fully with 
the strict reading of the CRPD Article 12. But the main hypothesis of our 
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research is that even this remains mostly black-letter law: supported 
decision-making has not become a living institution in the Hungarian 
legal practice yet. 
In the course of our research, we prepare tripartite case studies based 
on narrative life story interviews with people who are either under 
custodianship or who participate in supported decision-making, and 
persons they can trust informally, either in everyday life or in making 
more serious decisions, as well as professional career story interviews 
with their custodians or professional supporters. The narrative interview 
research has only begun in August 2020, in response to the COVID-19 
pandemic precautions. 
In this study we undertake a review of publicly available information 
on custodianship. We briefly describe and evaluate the macro-statistical 
data already mentioned, and in addition, we analyse in detail case law 
regarding the restriction of legal capacity of adults in Hungary. In the 
next part we describe the methodology, main questions and hypothesis 
of our case law analysis. After that we will summarize the current 
knowledge on which our study is based: we review the international 
literature about supported and substitute decision-making systems and 
the CRPD, and describe the Hungarian situation in more detail based on 
domestic literature. Among the results we present our research findings 
about our main research questions. 
2. Methodology and hypotheses of the research 
The case law analysis presented in this paper is part of a more 
comprehensive research on the operation of legal institutions related to 
the restriction of the legal capacity of adults in Hungary. In addition to 
custodianship, we also consider supported decision-making to be a sig-
nificant topic for research, as no comprehensive research has been 
conducted on it in Hungary since it was introduced in 2014. As for the 
operation of custodianship, apart from a small amount of macro- 
statistical data, we also have little empirical knowledge of the day-to- 
day operation of this legal institution. The main undertaking of the 
research is to get to know the living law regarding legal capacity re-
strictions, the everyday operation of custodianship and supported 
decision-making through tripartite sets of interviews. The rationale of 
this specific case law analysis is that judicial practice is the link between 
black-letter law and living law. Besides, supported decision-making in 
Hungary is a young law and its judicial practice remains under- 
researched. 
Our case law analysis is based on a public database which is not 
complete therefore its structure obviously puts obstacles to the way of 
our research. But one cannot ignore that the lack of transparency is a 
notable characteristic of the Hungarian custodianship law. This data-
base contains only the cases which reached the highest level of the 
Hungarian judiciary system while most of the custodianship cases end 
before first instance courts. The database is designed to inform the low 
level courts about the direction of judgement of the Supreme Court, 
satisfying public and scientific interest is just an additional benefit of its 
existence. So, our research is not directly about the complete Hungarian 
judicial practice on cases concerning the limitation of legal capacity of 
adults but rather about a specific reflection of this practice, a hand- 
picked set of cases which try to represent the desired judicial trend in 
this field. 
In preparation for the research in the autumn of 2019, we reviewed 
the available statistical data on custodianship and supported decision- 
making procedures. The range of available official statistics was rela-
tively narrow. The Hungarian Central Statistical Office collects data on 
the number of persons affected by custodianship, and certain reasons for 
placing an individual under custodianship. Data collected on supported 
decision-making was even more scarce, and official statistics on terri-
torial distribution were difficult to obtain. Processing the data was also 
complicated, since data collections related to those placed under 
custodianship approach the issue from two different perspectives. 
The collection of judicial statistics is fundamentally focused on the 
form of custodianship. However, the Hungarian Central Statistical Office 
focuses on institutional placement. Hence, very few conclusions 
regarding case law could be drawn from analysis of official statistical 
data. This situation is contrary to the Article 31 of the CRPD, which 
asserts that ‘States Parties undertake to collect appropriate information, 
including statistical and research data, to enable them to formulate and 
implement policies to give effect to the present Convention’. 
As a basis for our research, we performed an analysis of the judg-
ments published in the Collection of Court Decisions (hereinafter: the 
CCD) in the spring of 2020 (April–May). 
The database was created on 1 January 2006 in accordance with Act 
XC (2005) on the Electronic Freedom of Information. The aim of the 
regulation was to make the operation of the Hungarian judicial system 
more transparent by making the final decisions of the higher courts 
known. This serves the unity of the court decisions as well as allowing 
the unified judicial interpretation of the legislation to be made known to 
citizens seeking rights. 
The judgments of the two upper levels of the four-tier Hungarian 
court system, that is, the final decisions of the regional courts of appeal 
and the Curia, appear primarily in the CCD. These are the judgments 
given in the Curia's special extraordinary appeal procedure, the so-called 
review procedure, aimed at eliminating any violations of the law 
committed by the lower courts, and to some extent standardising the 
jurisprudence. In addition, final judgments in actions relating to the 
review of administrative decisions that become final at first instance 
(administrative actions) are also publicised. The lower-level (district 
court, tribunal) judgments on which these final decisions are based also 
appear in the CCD. Based on the above legislation, it is clear that only 
judgments affected by appeal appear in the system, except judgments in 
administrative actions (given that, as a general rule, there is no appeal 
against them). Since the Act V (2013) on the Civil Code (hereinafter: the 
new Civil Code) and Act CXXX (2016) on Civil Procedure Rules (here-
inafter: CPR) – similarly to the regulations before 2014/2017 – refers 
custodianship lawsuits to the jurisdiction of the district courts (prior to 1 
January 2012, the city courts), the CCD includes only those custodian-
ship lawsuits in which the Curia (or the Supreme Court, prior to 1 
January 2012) makes a decision in a review procedure, which is a 
relatively narrow group of judgments, as will be explained in more detail 
later. 
Moreover, not all of these appear in the database, since the rules, 
precisely because of the sensitivity of the decisions, allow anonymised 
publication to be dispensed with if the litigant objects. However, 
custodianship also appears in other ways in Hungarian judicial practice, 
primarily in disputes related to legal transactions, as limited capacity to 
act also represents a reason for the contract or the will being rendered 
invalid. The tribunals (until 31 December 2011, the county courts) have 
competence in the event of the value of the subject matter of the action 
reaching 5 million HUF, and, later, 30 million HUF in property law ac-
tions. As these first instance decisions may be appealed to the regional 
courts of appeal, these cases necessarily appear more widely in the CCD. 
Therefore, analysis of the CCD essentially does not show the entirety of 
Hungarian case law, rather only those cases leading to a review pro-
cedure, as well as property law cases – primarily inheritance cases – in 
which the subject value of the action was relatively high. We needed to 
consider all these factors when analysing and evaluating judgments. 
We found the relevant judgments using a keyword search. Based on 
the keyword ‘custodianship’ we found 1, 162 results. Since there were 
judgments that appeared more than once in the database, we processed a 
total of 948 judgments. In the first phase, we created a database of these 
judgments, in which we recorded each case number, the court hearing 
the case, the subject matter of the case, and the case number of the 
related first and second instance judgments, where relevant. Based on 
the database, only those actions related to placement under custodian-
ship, and review and termination of placement under custodianship 
were further examined, which accounted for 10.7% of all cases. 
The subject matter of the other cases varied considerably, the most 
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significant other groups being: tort cases (3.2%), contract invalidity in 
general (15.6%), and specifically maintenance (5.1%), annuity (1.2%), 
inheritance (3%), sale (2.2%), gift (1.3%) and gift reclaim (1.4%), and 
invalidity of a will (10%). They accounted for more than half of all cases 
(53.7%), but a total of more than two hundred types of cases appeared. 
Fig. 1 
The actual custodianship cases in the database – with two exceptions 
– all reached the Curia, which means the CCD also includes the first and 
second instance judgments of the given cases besides the review judg-
ments. We compiled these judgments to give a total of 36 cases. 
Based on the above mentioned analysis of the judgments in the CCD, 
one of our most important research questions concerned the degree to 
which the new Civil Code has affected judicial practice. This question im-
plies a classic ‘gap study’: we wanted to get better understanding of the 
functioning of this relatively new legislation. To answer this, it was an 
important question whether cases were judged on the basis of Act IV 
(1959) on the Civil Code of the Republic of Hungary (hereinafter: the old 
Civil Code) or the new Civil Code. A similar fundamental consideration 
was the nature of each case (for instance, initiating, terminating or 
reviewing custodianship) and who initiated the proceedings. 
Our next research question concerned the degree to which court pro-
ceedings are ritualized or substantive. There is a classic study in Hungarian 
legal sociology about legal cases concerning Roma people which intro-
duced the concept of ritualized court proceedings (H. Szilágyi & Loss, 
2012). The researchers used it to describe the phenomenon that if Roma 
people are concerned, no real legal argumentation unfolds before the 
court, the proceeding becomes an empty sequence of legally prescribed 
actions, a ‘legal ritual’. This phenomenon is a legal reflection of the 
social vulnerability of Roma people in Hungarian society. We considered 
this concept useful in this case, because custodianship affects other 
extremely vulnerable groups in society, people with psychosocial and 
intellectual disabilities, or dementia, which entails the danger of 
ritualization. 
This is a complex question, and in this study we only had limited 
tools to answer it. We have examined both quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of the cases to answer it. In terms of their quantitative aspects, 
we examined how long it took for the first and second instance and re-
view decisions to be made, and the length of the substantive reasoning 
for each decision. We also considered the decisions each court made in 
the cases, and whether they differed from the lower court decisions. 
Another aspect of the study was how many forensic psychiatric experts 
were appointed by the courts in a given case, and whether the court 
found it necessary to hear any other experts if requested by the parties. 
A softer, qualitative aspect of this problem was the extent to which 
the courts accept or critically evaluate psychiatric expert opinions. We 
noted whether the forensic expert only dealt with the psychiatric aspects 
of the case or also proposed to limit legal capacity in some aspects, 
which is already a matter of law, and therefore falls within the compe-
tence of the court. Similarly to the practice of other countries (Kapp, 
2007, p. 12–13, 18–19), psychological concepts (such as mental illness 
and its effect on the ability required by individuals to attend to their own 
affairs) are incorporated in Hungarian law, yet there are no adequate 
guidelines for courts to evaluate the opinion of psychiatric experts 
(Fiala-Butora, 2019; Maléth, 2018). We also examined whether any 
mention was made of a need for institutional placement or psychiatric 
treatment in the cases. 
In addition, we examined whether the affected persons claimed to 
have been seriously harmed during the proceedings, including, for 
example, psychiatric examinations being conducted forcefully or under 
pharmacological influence. 
As a first step in a later, in-depth, qualitative study, we asked the 
members of the research team to summarize the story behind each case 
and evaluate the wording and style of the judgments, which included 
how analytical the texts seemed to be and whether they contained 
offensive terms with pejorative, negative connotations (such as 
emotional desolation, emotional colourlessness, or lack of self-esteem). 
As a second phase of the research, we plan to conduct a discursive 
analysis of these judgments later. The results of this research could be 
the starting points of that second phase. 
Our fundamental question is how the institution of custodianship 
works in practice. During the processes of the judgments, we provided a 
number of aspects that were relevant in this regard. One of our main 
research questions was that of whose interest would be protected by the 
institution of custodianship. Our initial hypothesis in this regard was that 
in practice the institution of custodianship is not primarily used for its 
declared purpose, to protect the interests of the individual under 
custodianship, but for the protection of the interests or simple conve-
nience of another party. One of our hypotheses was that often the pur-
pose of preserving family property and inheritance is the main cause 
behind a decision to place an individual under custodianship. In these 
cases, prospective heirs initiate or support placement under custodian-
ship in order to ensure that the prospective testator does not ‘waste’ 
family property. Our other hypothesis was that it is a common phe-
nomenon to restrict the legal capacity of adults who constantly seek out 
authorities and official bodies with submissions, which the authorities 
consider harassment (‘litigation madness’), and restrain them by initi-
ating their placement under custodianship. 
3. The guardianship system and how it has changed in the light 
of international literature 
The roots of thinking about the capacity of adults, as well as the 
centuries/millennium-old ‘solution’, stem from a mostly restrictive 
approach that leads to the prevalence of guardianship systems world-
wide which today is called substitute decision-making (Wood, 2005). In 
this part of the study we examine the CRPD regulation, especially Article 
12 and how it is interpreted in the literature. After that we represent the 
Hungarian situation in detail. 
3.1. CRPD 
Substitute decision-making is incompatible with the approach and 
actual regulations of the CRPD. This is especially true with regard to 
Article 12, the clear ‘key’ of the Convention, which ensures the equal 
recognition of people with disabilities before the law, as well as these 
persons enjoying legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all as-
pects of life. According to Dhanda (2007), the full legal capacity 
emphasised in Article 12 also serves as a basis for interpretation of the 
additional rights formulated in the CRPD. At the same time, it is clear 
from the explanation provided by Kanter (2015) among others that this 
is the very article that, prior to the ratification of the CRPD, sparked the 
most heated debates: the interpretation and translation of the concept of 
Fig. 1. Distribution of judgments in the CCD containing the term ‘custodian-
ship’ by type of case. 
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‘legal capacity’ divided the representatives of the states discussing it 
because of their differing legal systems. Despite reservations regarding 
the meaning of legal capacity and of the compromises reached, it can be 
said that Article 12 focuses on the model that assists and supports the 
practice of legal capacity. This modell replaces the custodianship sys-
tem, because its smashing power presents issues that repeatedly occupy 
scientists representing a variety of fields. Article 12 is the most pro-
gressive, and at the same time, the most controversial article of the 
CRPD (Fiala-Butora, 2017; Lord & Stein, 2013) Many commentators 
consider it as a paradigm shift in the process of approaching legal ca-
pacity that requires significant changes in the existing guardian systems 
((Lawson, 2007); Keys, 2009; Quinn & Arstein-Kerslake, 2012). Based 
on Article 12, some go even further, arguing that it is necessary to 
abolish all guardianship schemes, based on their practice of the legal 
capacity’ limitation, and it requires the introduction of measures sup-
porting the practice of legal capacity (Fiala-Butora, 2017; Minkowitz, 
2007). Regarding Article 12, (Turnbull, 2019) calls the implementation 
process taking place in the countries ratifying the CRPD – palpably and 
very aptly – ‘the emancipation from the Dead Hand of Paternalism’. It is 
not surprising that (Lawson, 2007) referred to guardianship as ‘civil 
death’, and persons subject to it as 'legally missing' (Quinn, 2010). 
The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in its 
General Comment No. 1. (2014) made it particularly clear that Article 
12 rejects all forms of surrogate decision-making, and as such, every 
form of guardianship (UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, 2014). Based on this, guardianship cannot be considered as 
a measure that can assist a person with any disability in practicing their 
legal capacity. Therefore, the Commission's position is that any form of 
restricting legal capacity is a violation of the Convention, and only such 
forms of supporting the decision making of a person with disabilities can 
be accepted that does not limit their legal capacity (Fiala-Butora, 2019). 
However, it is not at all clear, how far exactly the wording of Article 
12 extends. Largely, two conflicting views have emerged in the legal 
literature about its limits, which differ mainly in the question of how it 
applies to persons with the most severe disabilities. (Fiala-Butora, 2019) 
names the two conflicting views the Absolutist and the Constricted Po-
sition, but of course not all authors represent these clear positions. 
Hereinafter we invite the reader to peruse the literature related to 
what is implied in the CRPD and Article 12, which lies at the essence of 
our research. 
According to Arstein-Kerslake & Flynn, 2016, and Arstein-Kerslake 
and Black (2020), the right to legal capacity means that every person, 
including those with disabilities, is considered as a decision-maker 
recognised on an equal basis with others, and that his or her decisions 
are also honoured in a way declared by law. Dhanda already suggested 
in 2007 that due to the discriminative nature of disenfranchisement 
under guardianship, it is necessary to have a universal paradigm of legal 
capacity (Dhanda, 2007). 
As a legal alternative to guardianship, the CRPD introduced a con-
struction assisting the practice of legal capacity of people living with 
certain disabilities (primarily an intellectual or cognitive disability), 
which has become mainly known as ‘supported decision-making’ 
(hereinafter SDM). SDM enables people living with disabilities to enjoy 
their rights as active players, that is, to make their own decisions about 
their own lives, through reasonable accommodation, while observing 
individual needs (Browning, Bigby, & Douglas, 2020; Donelly, 2019; 
Harding & Tasciouglu, 2018; Salzman, 2010). 
Although certain researchers (Then, Carney, Bigby, & Douglas, 
2018) attempted to draft the internationally known SDM models ac-
cording to specific criteria, they also determined that as yet no uniform 
(legal) definition describing SDM has been accepted. 
They cited a number of conceptual definitions as examples, and 
based on their references they specified that irrespective of the lack of a 
uniform definition, the legal essence of SDM is the following: providing 
support for a concerned person who needs help in making his or her own 
decisions. 
Returning to the CRPD as the first international human rights cata-
logue of the 21st century, Kanter (2015) stated that although at first 
glance, it fundamentally includes rights declared in previously ratified 
human rights documents, it may still be considered a milestone as – 
precisely due to its recognition of legal capacity – it throws new light 
upon these rights. 
At the same time, Kanter (2015), in her book, The development of 
disability rights under international law: from charity to human rights, which 
is considered compulsory reading for professionals in this field, em-
phasizes precisely the new human rights implied in the CRPD, such as 
living in a community and the right to support and accommodation, 
while also discussing the new interpretation of human rights that had 
also existed previously (such as liberty, security, integrity and access to 
justice). Turnbull, Beegle, and Stowe (2001) emphasize two funda-
mental concepts of disability policy as positive rights in connection with 
liberty: the autonomy of people with disabilities and their empower-
ment to participate in decision-making processes (Shogren et al., 2019). 
At the same time, regarding with the latter, it is worth referring to 
Harding's relationship focused theory ((Harding et al., 2017)), which 
will be expounded later. 
Kanter (2015) also stresses that the CRPD is a convention of crucial 
significance, not only for persons with disabilities, but also in terms of 
the development of international human rights. 
Although the CRPD does not define the meaning of disability, but 
rather opts for an illustrative list and draws attention specifically to the 
rights that can be practised by the concerned circle, this is probably also 
why it is the first international document in which, behind the concept 
of ‘a person with a disability’, an active, equal citizen is described, who 
can and is able to undertake various social roles (Kanter, 2015). Thus, as 
also stated by Dhanda (2008) and Quinn (2009), the Convention shifts 
from the previously defining priority of care to the supremacy of rights 
with respect to the approach to disability and people with disabilities. 
At the same time, taking the above into consideration, Article 12 also 
concerns the fundamental question whom we regard as human beings. 
As Quinn (2010) also asserts, there can be no doubt in the case of people 
with disabilities regarding their humanness. Since one of the reserva-
tions about the Article was that it is impossible or difficult to reconcile 
the needs of people with intensive support needs and their ability to 
exercise various rights, Quinn (2010) considers Point 3 of Article 12 the 
key to the shift in paradigm. According to this Point, ‘States Parties shall 
take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities 
to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity’, which 
is of special significance as it can be reasonably assumed and expected 
regarding the necessary measure to be taken by the states that it should 
also be able to extend the possibilities for empowerment to the most 
extreme cases. Confirming the above, Gooding (2013) in accordance 
with the above mentioned ‘Absolutist Position’ also emphasizes that 
even if a person requires maximum support, it must be ensured that this 
person can fully exercise his or her legal capacity. 
Following the above, Article 12 seems to break the hegemony of 
traditionally ‘ensuring’ legal capacity with various custodianship sys-
tems once and for all, in addition to which certain regional international 
documents, such as the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe (1999), and the Yokohama Declaration on 
Adult Guardianship (2010) – this latter also being in accordance with 
the recommendations of the CRPD Committee – also emphasize the 
principles of equal recognition before the law. It is worth mentioning 
that the Yokohama Declaration additionally calls for the exercise of self- 
directed decision-making options, rather than the institution of tradi-
tional guardianship, as well as including so-called substituted proxy 
decision-making in the latter. At the same time, according to this 
Declaration, the substitute decision-making systems are still consistent 
with the principles of SDM. 
It is stated in the Declaration that guardianship law should provide 
primary opportunity for consideration, and give significance to indi-
vidual will and choices, as well as the wishes of the individual, and this 
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principle should be implemented in such a way that it supports indi-
vidual self-determination, and prevents harm to the person (Dinerstein, 
Grewal, & Martinis, 2016) and Shogren et al., 2019). 
At the same time, in 2009 Dhanda – contrary to what is implied in the 
Yokohama Declaration published somewhat later – stated her position, 
according to which the prolongation of the institution of guardianship, 
even if it exists alongside the practice of SDM, would contradict the 
approach and principles of the full text of the CRPD. Since one of the 
main principles of the CRPD is one of respect for the innate dignity and 
autonomy of the individual, consequently – according to Dhanda (2009) 
– every substitute decision-making system contradicts Article 12. 
Therefore, Dhanda's views are definitely in accordance with the UN 
Committee on CRDP's General Comment No. 1 (2014) – Article 12: Equal 
recognition before the law, CRPD/C/GC/1, 19 May 2014. 
In recent years, Dhanda (2009) and several other authors have 
addressed the characteristics of substitute decision-making systems, and 
likewise those of declarations of incapacity, and they have thus 
described the discriminative nature of legal systems, which in this 
respect have primarily narrowed the circle of people with intellectual 
and psychosocial disabilities (Bach, 2007; Quinn, 2010). In relation to 
guardianship, several authors have raised the topic of the deficit-based 
model, while on the other hand SDM was characterized as a strength- 
based approach (Shogren et al., 2019). 
There is relatively extensive literature on the meaning of the con-
cepts of capacity and competency from their field of the concept of ca-
pacity (Appelbaum, Mirkin, & Bateman, 1981; Winick, 1995; Glass, 
1997; Verma & Silberfield, 1997; Hale, 1997; Kapp, 2007; Grisso, 2003; 
Moye & Marson, 2007; Bach & Kerzer, 2010). According to Jakab 
(2011), research on capacity and how it is measured serve as an 
important base from which to understand the institution of SDM. The 
difference between cognitive and non-cognitive capacities has relevance 
with regard to decision-making capacity (Wilber & Reynolds, 1995), as 
well as to the theory of full legal capacity. 
According to Then et al. (2018), the diverging aspects – those for the 
parallel existence of substitute decision-making and SDM, and those for 
the full elimination of substitute decision-making – mostly concern the 
conceptual difference of ‘capacity’: in one version, SDM is a spectrum of 
decision-making alternatives that co-exist with substitute decision-making 
mechanisms applied as a final solution, in which the legal procedure itself 
determines which decision-making method may be suitable. The other 
approach considers SDM as a full shift of paradigm, a solution that entirely 
takes the place of substitute decision-making models, and not depriving 
the affected person of his or her legal capacity to act. This latter is also 
coinciding with the CRPD Committee's General Comment No. 1. 
Although it cannot be said that SDM is not, in general, legally rec-
ognised worldwide, it is becoming increasingly accepted, and is, for 
example, typical in various provinces and territories of Canada, even if 
to varying degrees, as well as in Ireland, in certain states of the USA, in 
South-American countries such as Peru, Argentina, Costa Rica or 
Columbia, in Europe, including Eastern European countries such as 
Croatia, Latvia and Hungary (Then et al., 2018), and in certain federal 
states of Australia. 
The practice of legal capacity and Article 12 are widely discussed in 
the context of disability laws by the following; Dhanda, 2007; Lewis, 
2010; Quinn, 2010; Carney, 2012; Dinerstein, 2012; Gooding, 2015; 
Kanter, 2015; Arstein-Kerslake, 2016; Szmukler, 2019. 
Several research studies on SDM focus on the experience of specific 
groups of affected people: the decision-making of people with traumatic 
brain surgery is addressed by Harding & Tasciouglu, 2018; Knox, 
Douglas, & M., & Bigby C., 2015; that of people with dementia by 
Fetherstonhaugh, Tarzia, Bauer, Nay, & Beattie, 2016; Sinclair et al., 
2018; that of people with a disability with high support needs by Wat-
son, 2016; Watson, Voss, & Bloomer, 2019; in respect to family members 
the research of Sinclair et al., 2018 is conclusive, while in respect to 
people working in services supporting individuals with disabilities that 
of Harding & Tasciouglu, 2018, and Bigby, Whiteside, & Douglas, 2017 
is conclusive. 
In their 2019 research study, Shogren et al. identified several 
contextual and environmental factors that shape the decision-making 
process for the people concerned, such as experience of decision- 
making, emotions, the characteristics of the given disability, access to 
information, the complexity of the decision, the relationship with ser-
vice providers, the decision-making situations and the attitude of the 
family with regard to the way of decision-making (Shogren et al., 2019). 
Harding, Fletcher, and Beasley (2017) takes up the challenge of 
exploring the conceptual links between care, relationality and supported 
decision-making of people with cognitive disabilities. Harding et al. 
(2017) tries to bring into focus that different relationality of care (formal 
and informal, personal and professional), with the social and legal 
norms, shapes the everyday experiences of people with cognitive 
disabilities. 
Harding’s theory (2017) is verified by numerous empirical studies 
(Nunnelley, 2015; Wallace, 2012), saying that the personal support 
network serves as a very rich basis during the supported decision- 
making. The latter mentioned research's narrations show that with the 
supported decision-making, stakeholders are more involved in the 
community as their network of supporters is being expanded, and 
finally, supported decision-making was found to be a viable, quality 
alternative for those who were under guardianship previously (Sándor & 
Katona, 2021). 
It is also worth mentioning that the right of legal capacity is also of 
high priority in the field of therapeutic jurisprudence, the legal trend of 
which has rapidly gained importance in the past thirty years, according 
to Perlin (2019). The right to legal capacity is fundamental according to 
therapeutic jurisprudence, due to the close connection between indi-
vidual autonomy and well-being, considering that therapeutic goals may 
also be jeopardised if the concerned individual cannot make decisions 
about his or her own life, or even about the form and method of his or 
her rehabilitation (Winick, 1992, 1997). Wexler (2000) sees it as a 
criticism of more recent literature on therapeutic jurisprudence that the 
fundamental commitment to individual autonomy is missing. It has been 
suggested that the rift between the right to legal capacity and thera-
peutic jurisprudence may originate from the distancing of the latter from 
critical disability theory. According to Siebers (2008), critical disability 
theory emphasizes the importance of departing from ‘therapy’, as the 
word ‘therapy’ suggests that the disability needs to be cured. It criticizes 
the reliability of the professional judgement of the given therapeutic 
method, which in many cases may supersede the will or wishes of the 
concerned persons. The person's wishes, however, are important as it is 
he or she who can control the therapeutic procedure themselves, 
including the aim of the therapy, which may be of a curative nature or, 
for example, ‘intervention’ to combat social obstacles (Shakespeare, 
2006). In the interpretation of the CRPD Committee, the emphasis on 
autonomy requires respect and recognition with regard to the persons' 
legal capacity, including the right to individual decision-making 
regarding therapy. Although these objections were worded by schools 
of critical disability studies, with the word ‘therapy’ being applied pri-
marily in the context of health care, according to Arstein-Kerslake and 
Black (2020), it is debatable whether the critical judgement of some-
thing as being ‘therapeutic’ may equally be valid for a legal procedure, 
as therapeutic jurisprudence also belongs to this area(Winick and 
Wexler, 2003). 
Owing to the recognition of the CRPD and the SDM implementation 
processes taking place in the world, and based on the research of (Then 
et al., 2018) – conducted in the milieu of certain Law Reform Agencies – 
it may, as we have already indicated, be determined that the following 
legal models exist based on the degree to which SDM is implemented:  
1. Limited recognition in principles  
2. Partial legal implementation  
3. Complete legal scheme 
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3.2. Position in Hungary 
In light of the above classification, it is clear, regarding the effective 
Hungarian regulatory framework of legal capacity, that although two 
laws were passed in 2013 in Hungary on the implementation of the SDM- 
model (the new Civil Code and Act CLV (2013) on Supported Decision- 
Making), with both coming into force in 2014, due to various codifica-
tion reasons and in light of the specific legislative environment – 
considering the situation outlined in the research of (Then et al., 2018) – 
we are in the phase of the partial legal implementation of these laws, and what 
is more, this implementation is in its infancy. 
In the international literature review chapter (3.1.) of our article, we 
use the term ‘guardianship’ that is well-known in the countries that have 
ratified the CRPD, and even beyond, which is, in fact, also fully inter-
changeable with the term ‘custodianship’. We use the term ‘custodian-
ship’ in the section about the findings of our research of the Hungarian 
legal system according to the official translation of this legal institution 
in Hungary. This term includes the same substitute decision-making 
mechanism for adults with limited legal capacity that is known in the 
international literature as ‘guardianship’. The usage of the Hungarian 
terminology was strongly influenced by the difference between the cura 
(tutela) and the custodia in the Roman law, and in the Hungarian law the 
concept of guardianship, unlike the original common law usage, was 
rather used for the concept of cura (tutela), based on the Roman legal 
traditions. In Hungary, the current civil law regulations declare two 
degrees of the legal institution of guardianship/custodianship system, 
which is accompanied by the restrictions of legal capacity: plenary and 
partially limited guardianship of the legal capacity. The introduction of 
supported decision making in Hungary — on the level of regulation — 
has opened a new way, an alternative, which supports practicing of legal 
capacity by appointing a supporting person, so in these cases, there can 
be no restriction of rights. 
In Hungary the SDM-model is considered – in light of the effective 
regulation – specifically as an alternative to appointing a custodian. 
Since SDM is not restricting, it may offer institutionalised substitute to 
the appointment of the custodian. But the responsibility of using this 
new legal instrument (meaning, on an individual level, the re-
sponsibility of correctly assessing decisinon making ability, and on the 
general level of legal application, calling for transformation of the sys-
tem) is mostly entrusted to the courts. In Hungary the judges are not in 
an institutional position to fulfill this potential which is reflected by 
statistical data (Fiala-Butora, 2019; Gulya & Hoffman, 2019). Therefore, 
judges presiding over custodianship lawsuits would play an outstanding and 
markedly decisive role in the transformation of thinking about the concept of 
legal capacity. Thus, in Hungary – due to the reduced existence of insight 
as a decisive ‘standard’ and through naming and applying the central 
consideration criterion as a law – it is primarily a legal procedure (that of 
custodianship lawsuits and their outcome) that continues to determine 
which decision-making method may be suitable for the concerned 
individual. 
At the same time, while assessing a given person's decision-making 
capacity, the individual judges attitudes, are influenced by several fac-
tors: their former experience, assumptions (perhaps prejudices), and 
attitudes towards the topic are not irrelevant, the quality and quantity of 
their communication with the concerned individual is also decisive in 
their approach to shaping the final judgement. In addition to this, 
custodianship lawsuits are of primary significance among actions con-
cerning personal status, and besides considering the so-called interest of 
the individual (in these cases, the rights of persons with a disability) a 
priority, to be specially protected, the judges should have special 
expertise in the field of augmentative and alternative modes, means and 
formats of communication, including accessible information and 
communication technology. 
The fact that Act CLV (2013) on Supported Decision-Making includes 
several provisions and emphasizes regulatory points, which may include 
the above described recognition of SDM at a so-called full legal 
framework level, is not contradictory to the above. 
In Hungary, SDM continues to be only one of various possible 
decision-making alternatives, and in the light of the available referred 
statistical data, the weakest of those alternatives (Gulya & Hoffman, 
2019). SDM in Hungary – looking at the entire spectrum of the effective 
legal capacity regulation – co-exists as a perforce born step-child with 
substitute decision-making mechanisms. Both of them can be found in 
the new Civil Code, but in the practice the possibility of SDM not 
consistently weighed in every case, although on a theoretical level, 
custodianship would be only applicable as a so-called final solution, 
according to the principle of necessity and proportionality. Conse-
quently – even if the concerned person can directly turn to the court of 
custodians in order to draw on the SDM service, and may request the 
appointment of a supporting person – for several reasons a civil action 
(some custodianship or guardianship lawsuit) according to CPR pre-
dominantly and decisively continues to determine which decision- 
making method may be suitable for the given person. 
According to Könczei (2019), “if we pay attention well, here (and not 
only in Hungary, according to the authors) – in connection with sup-
ported decision-making – a philosophical vicious circle is outlined in 
front of our eyes that is closed from each direction, and which is made up 
of the following: ‘you look from there and I look from here, and we don't 
get through”. However, several kinds of tools can be used to confront 
this vicious circle. Könczei considers the method stemming from the 
main idea of supported decision-making to be the method most suitable 
for solving this ‘vicious circle’: a comparative analysis of the empirical 
narrative, including the narratives of the concerned people and their 
own groups. For this, it will be also necessary for the personal experi-
ences to be incorporated into evidence-based practice, and not remain 
merely objectives, for which initiatives exist. 
4. Results 
Our research questions were as follows: firstly we examined the 
impact of the recodification of the Civil Code on judicial practice. Our 
most comprehensive, most complex question was how substantive or 
ritualized the issues related to custodianship were. Finally, we examined 
whether the declared and real purpose of placing under custodianship 
corresponded. Our main findings related to these research questions are 
described as follows. 
4.1. The effect of the recodification of the Ccivil Ccode on judicial practice 
An important issue in the codification of the new Civil Code was how 
to integrate the relevant requirements of the CRPD, ratified in 2007, into 
the renewable regulation of legal capacity. Article 12 of the CRPD ad-
dresses the issue of equal recognition before the law and states that 
States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities should enjoy 
legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life, and that 
States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by 
persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising 
their legal capacity. This wording of the CRPD is often interpreted as a 
shift of paradigm: it becomes necessary to remove the legal institutions 
of substitute decision-making and to introduce supported decision- 
making. 
Act CXX of 2009 on the Civil Code (hereinafter: the Civil Code 
(2009)), which finally did not enter into force, would have abolished the 
possibility of placement under general custodianship in the Hungarian 
Republic, in accordance with the CRPD. If someone lacked the ability to 
take care of their own affairs, the Civil Code (2009) would have intro-
duced or maintained the following three legal institutions: the prior 
judicial act, supported decision-making and custodianship that partially 
limits capacity. With these legal tools, it would have introduced a more 
differentiated system, which also included less restrictive solutions. 
The Civil Code (2009) was approved by Parliament, but it did not 
enter into force, following the decision of the Constitutional Court, so 
V. Kiss et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 78 (2021) 101719
7
the recodification process continued. The new Civil Code, which finally 
came into force, retained the legal institution of the prior judicial act and 
supported decision-making, but the structure and content of the regu-
lation differ significantly from the Civil Code (2009). The new Civil Code 
still considers substitute decision-making as a primary tool in the field of 
‘assistance’ for adults with limited ability to take care of their own af-
fairs. Custodianship fully limiting capacity to act is a last resort, but it 
still exists as a possible option (Fiala-Butora, 2019, p. 9)(Kiss, 2018) 
(Hoffman & Könczei, 2010). Once this has all been settled in the new 
Civil Code, it contains some basic rules for supported decision-making 
and finally provides for the possibility of a prior judicial act. Overall, 
the regulation of the new Civil Code remains restrictive. The whole 
structure of the regulation suggests that the most important legal mea-
sure to tackle these issues is that of surrogate decision-making. This is 
further strengthened by the central importance of the concept of limited 
capacity to act, as well as the resulting examination of the individual 
being of sound mind, without a clear legal definition of what a sound 
mind is. 
In the autumn of 2012, the Hungarian national report of the CRPD 
was revised. At that time, the CRPD Committee explained that, as is clear 
from the wording of the Convention, the national rules in conformity 
with the Convention would ensure that every person has a say and final 
decision-making power over the decisions that determine his or her life. 
Therefore, substitute decision-making mechanisms, that is, partial or 
total restrictions on the capacity to act, are incompatible with the 
Convention (Gurbai, 2012). 
With regard to the above, an important question for our study was 
how the shift of paradigm required by the Convention, which the new 
Civil Code was able to transpose into Hungarian law only with some 
restraint, would appear in judicial practice. 
The new Civil Code had a significant impact on case law in at least 
one way. In cases in which the court partially restricted the legal ca-
pacity of the person concerned, it had to identify the categories of cases 
to which the restriction applied. However, in half the cases decided 
under the new Civil Code, the court identified so many categories of 
cases that it could almost be considered a general restriction. There was 
only one case in which the Curia completely overruled the first instance 
decision in the review decision, and justified this, at least in part, by 
compliance with the CRPD. In paragraphs 29 and 30 of the judgement, 
the court clearly separated the assessment of the expert's opinion from 
the decision on the issue of legal capacity: 
The expert opinion attests the litigant's mental disorder as evidence, 
and it is the task of the court to decide on the scope of the litigant's 
capacity to act independently in his own case, which may involve a 
necessary and proportionate restriction of personal autonomy. The 
court thus assesses the administrative capacity of the person con-
cerned and the need for legal restriction together with other facts of 
the case. Based on the expert opinion, the hospital documentation 
and the personal interview conducted by the court, it can be clearly 
stated that the litigant understands the questions addressed to him, 
gives adequate answers, is aware of his circumstances, and is 
informed about the issue concerning the right to vote. He is able to 
recognize his own interests in money management, his addiction, 
and his daily care, in addition to which he has determined that he 
needs help, which he also uses. [...] (Judgement No. Pfv.II.20.198/ 
2019/7.) 
The final conclusion of the Curia was that fully limiting custodian-
ship in this case did not comply with the principles of necessity and 
proportionality, but it stated in paragraph 39 of the judgement that 
‘there is no legal impediment to the applicant bring an action for 
custodianship of the litigant in respect of certain specific categories of 
cases’. 
Supported decision-making usually does not appear as a realistic 
alternative to surrogate decision-making in court practice. In one case, 
the possibility of appointing a supporter was raised as a solution to the 
situation of the person concerned. In this case, the court rejected this 
argument: 
The control and provision of regular medication is not considered to 
be one of the possible tasks of the supporter. The stable condition of 
the applicant's mental well-being is based on regular medication, 
which is hampered by a lack of acknowledgement of mental illness. 
Due to the lack of acknowledgement of the mental illness, the pro-
tection of the plaintiff's rights would not be ensured by the supported 
decision-making, due to its voluntary nature, so the appellate court 
made a correct decision when the plaintiff was placed under custo-
dianship regarding decisions about health care, and it initiated the 
appointment of a supporter who can help the plaintiff in other cat-
egories of cases such as property issues, the administration of official 
procedures and the choice of residence (provided that the plaintiff 
agrees). (Judgement No. Pfv.II.21.953/2014/5.) 
Overall, in the published cases closed on the basis of the new Civil 
Code, there is an intention to suppress the tendency of general limitation 
and restrict limitation to more thoughtfully selected categories of cases. 
In the case presented above, the Curia has made visible efforts to orient 
the courts in this direction, to encourage a legal, substantive evaluation 
of the expert opinion, to separate legal issues from psychiatric evalua-
tion, and to ensure that courts only limit self-determination when it is 
inevitable, based on the facts of the case, that is, in the most necessary 
circumstances. 
However, while it is emphatically stated in this Curia judgement that 
there is no room for judicial automation based on expert opinion, we 
have frequently encountered cases in which a forensic psychiatric expert 
has proposed case categories, according to which the court should limit 
legal capacity, and besides considering all the evidence available, the 
court has accepted this proposal. A typical example is described as 
follows: 
According to the the opinion of the expert, due to the litigant's lack of 
sound mind, incipient mental decline and overall state of mind, he 
lacks the ability required to take care of his own affairs in those cases 
related to the right of disposal over property, including movable 
property, real estate and matrimonial property, to make decisions 
related to maintenance obligations, to make a housing declaration 
(concluding or terminating a tenancy contract) and the exercise of 
rights related to health care, therefore, according to the expert, 
placing him under the custodianship of legal capacity in these cate-
gories of cases is medically justified and recommended. [...] [The 
court, according to the expert opinion] places the litigant under 
partially limiting custodianship in the following respects: the right of 
disposal over property, including movable property, real estate and 
matrimonial property, to make decisions related to maintenance 
obligations, to make a housing declaration (concluding or termi-
nating a tenancy contract) and the exercise of rights related to health 
care. (Judgement No. 4.P.20.746/2007/39.) 
Thus, it is not yet clear from the examined cases whether the spirit of 
the CRPD would permeate judicial decisions, the shift in paradigm 
mentioned above did not appear. Although the Convention is mentioned 
by the courts in four cases, in no single case did it result in a rejection of 
the surrogate decision-making solution. 
4.2. Do court proceedings provide a substantive remedy in matters of 
custodianship? 
Our next research question concerned the degree to which court 
proceedings were ritualized in legal capacity-related cases. The 
following criteria were used to assess this: the length of the procedures, 
the length of the substantive reasoning of the judgments, and the 
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agreement between the courts of different levels. However, perhaps the 
most important data in judging this issue is not that concerning trends in 
the published cases, but the insignificant proportion of cases that reach 
the Curia. 
As previously mentioned, only thirty-six cases have been published 
in the CCD since 2006. This means approximately three cases per year. 
Unfortunately, there is no exact data on how many custodianship cases 
go to domestic courts in a year, but we can gauge this number as follows. 
Between 2007 and 2017, the number of people placed under custodi-
anship increased by more than 6, 000 so the yearly average is 600 cases 
per year (Hoffman, Gulya, & Tőkey, 2020). Fig. 2 
However, while assessing the number of custodianship actions we 
must also take into account the deaths of persons under custodianship. 
According to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office data, the number 
of deaths per 1, 000 people in Hungary was around 13 during the studied 
period. Considering their age and health status, the mortality rate 
among persons under custodianship should be at least as high as in the 
entire Hungarian population, and their number was consistently over 
50, 000, so we can expect more than 600 to die each year. If we allow for 
600 people under custodianship to die every year, and add it to the ten- 
year average increase of 600 more people living under custodianship 
every year, we arrive at the conclusion that more than 1, 200 people are 
placed under custodianship each year. Thus, the number of actions 
ending in custodianship alone is in the order of thousands per year, and 
by implication, the total number of all custodianship-related actions per 
year is even higher, including cases where an action for custodianship is 
dismissed, actions for termination of custody, and mandatory reviews. 
Thus, from the fact that on average only three cases out of thousands of 
lawsuits per year appear in the CCD, we can conclude that there is a 
negligible number of appeals. 
It can also be seen from the cases that we have examined that often 
these appeals do not constitute a real or substantive remedy, as in 
practice the second instance ‘disappears’. In twenty-nine cases, the de-
cisions made on appeal upheld the judgement of the court of first 
instance in its entirety, which constitutes more than 80% of the pub-
lished cases. Fig. 3 
However, in the remaining seven cases, only twice did the appellate 
court change the first instance decision in such a way that it resulted in a 
greater limitation of legal capacity. This trend is not reversed in review 
proceedings either, with the Curia (or the Supreme Court) leaving the 
decision of the appellate court in its entirety in thirty-one cases. Two 
cases were not reviewed, so these cases represent 91% of all published 
review decisions. In the remaining three cases, the Curia, without 
exception, reached a decision which resulted in a lesser limitation of the 
person's capacity to act than in the second instance decision. 
The length of the proceedings also supported this hypothesis: while 
first instance judgments were delivered in only seven cases in the year 
the action was brought, an average of 6.5 months was sufficient to reach 
a second instance decision in published cases. By comparison, review 
decisions were made in an average of one year. 
Another aspect was the length of the text of the substantive reasoning 
of the judgement. The text of the reasoning for first instance decisions 
averaged 13, 884 characters, while that for second instance decisions 
was 5, 675, meaning that the reasoning for first instance decisions was 
2.4 times longer on average. The substantive reasoning for the review 
decisions fell between the two: an average of 8, 104 characters. Fig. 4 
Another important aspect is the issue of expert judgement. In 72% of 
the published cases we examined (twenty-six cases), the courts fully 
accepted the opinion of the (mostly) single forensic psychiatric expert, 
and in most cases the need for the opinion of an additional forensic 
expert did not arise. Fig. 5 
Fig. 2. Change in the number of persons under custodianship in Hungary between 2014 and 2017 (Edited by the authors. Source: Hungarian Central Statisti-
cal Office). 
Fig. 3. Appellate Court Decisions in Custodianship Cases in CCD (Edited by 
the authors). 
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Where this need arose, the appointment of additional experts was 
initiated in 27% of cases by the parties, but was rejected by the trial 
court. In many cases, this phenomenon manifested itself in the use of the 
term ‘clear expert opinion’. In the other cases, at least one level of the 
judicial system differed from the expert opinion or stated that the 
medical expert opinion of the mental state of the individual concerned 
was not in itself decisive in the case. One of the clearest formulations of 
this was given by the Curia in its decision cited earlier. 
It can be concluded that these actions are comparatively brief, 
especially when the weight of the limitation is also taken into account. 
Naturally, we do not argue for the extension of proceedings, but taking 
into account other aspects, the picture emerges that in most proceedings 
no substantive dispute arises, in many cases the higher courts uphold the 
judgement of the lower court in its entirety, and in the vast majority of 
cases - as exemplified by the passage cited above, there is no legal, 
critical assessment of the expert's opinion. This all serves to illustrate an 
oiled system that is not constrained by the human rights considerations 
intrinsic to the CRPD. In the remaining part of our research, we will 
attempt to examine the extent to which this system serves the protection 
of the rights of those concerned by other methods. 
4.3. Whose interests are served by ordering or maintaining custodianship? 
The supposed goal of custodianship is the protection of the legal in-
terests of the persons concerned. If a person with passive legal capacity 
does not have, or only has in part, the ability to deal with their own 
affairs, then the deficit in their capacities has been filled by an external 
person, that is, by the custodian (Fiala-Butora, 2019; Maléth, 2018). This 
protective nature of the custodianship is emphasised by the supporter of 
the use of that legal institution (Kőrös, 2009). There is another approach 
to the nature of custodianship, that of the fundamental human rights 
approach, which emphasizes the restrictive nature of custodianship. 
External persons, namely the custodians, are responsible for making the 
most important decisions concerning the persons under custodianship, 
thus the personal autonomy of the latter is significantly restricted (Fiala, 
2009). 
The restrictive nature of custodianship can be observed in publicised 
judgments. Property issues play a very significant role in public judg-
ments, especially in issues of inheritance and maintenance. (As we have 
mentioned earlier, this is partially related to the regulations on the 
publicity of judgments in Hungary.) In these cases, the major issue of the 
procedures is the validity of wills, inheritance contracts, maintenance 
contracts, and life annuity contracts, since the testator's or contractor's 
ability to act has been challenged – mainly by the claimant. Several 
procedures on custodianship have served as tools for smoothing conflicts 
between the given person (mainly the litigant) and their environment. 
This issue is significant in those procedures that are based on the ‘liti-
gation madness’ of the litigants. These issues represent a significant 
share: 11.1% of the publicised judgments on ordering and maintaining 
custodianship have been related to ‘litigation madness’. In these cases, 
one of the major arguments of the claimant was the lack of ‘disease 
awareness’ on the part of the litigant, hence the passive legal capacity of 
the litigants was mainly restricted in decisions concerning health issues. 
The justifications of these judgments stated that the litigants refused 
those therapies by which their health status could be improved. The 
argumentation of the justifications was based on the statements of the 
forensic experts (mainly psychiatrists) in which the litigant was diag-
nosed with a paranoid personality disorder. These cases were based on 
conflicts between the litigants and the authorities, the courts, the public 
prosecutors and other persons in contact with the litigants. To provide 
these therapies for the litigants, the restriction of the independent de-
cision of these persons – the custodianship – was ordered by the courts. 
The judicial practice of the Hungarian courts is consistent, that the ‘high 
number of the litigations started by the litigant is not enough (on its 
own) to state the abnormal tendency to litigate, the judicial examination 
of the former litigations and other documents is expected.’ The justifi-
cations of the courts are mainly based on a paternalistic approach: the 
litigants shall be protected by ordering custodianship against their 
negative actions, which can harm their interest, as significant and un-
necessary financial burden on the litigant has been involved by the 
initiating of unfounded litigations. 
In these cases – which were based on ‘litigation madness’ – ordering 
custodianship was interpreted by the litigants as a restriction of their 
Fig. 4. Length of substantive reasoning for court judgments (in characters, including spaces).  
Fig. 5. Consideration of forensic expert opinion in cases published in the CCD.  
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rights (and not as an act of protection), so they filed appeals. Extraor-
dinary appeals (review procedures in the Curia) were also filed by the 
litigants. These elements of the procedure can impact the high share 
(more than 10%) of the procedures based on ‘litigation madness’ among 
the publicised custodianship judgments. However, there is a possibility 
that the share of these actions is lower among the first instance (district) 
court judgments. 
Property interests can also be observed in custodianship lawsuits. In 
several cases the preservation of family property also appeared as an 
issue, but in the practice of the Curia property issues do not have a 
higher share of actions on custodianship, rather, they play a more sig-
nificant role in contractual and testamentary disputes that are related to 
custodianship and to the ability to act of the persons concerned. How-
ever, 77.7% of publicised custodianship cases (twenty-eight of thirty-six 
cases) are related – at least partly – to property issues. In twelve of these 
twenty-eight cases (one-third of all cases) the protection or the 
improvement of the protection of the property of the litigant is 
emphasised by the courts. The harm to their property interests – caused 
by custodianship – was raised up as an important issue by the litigants of 
the procedures on ordering custodianship or the persons who are under 
custodianship. In eight cases (22.2% of the cases) they stated that they 
were ‘turned out’ of their possessions by the custodianship or the tem-
porary custodianship (or, in their view, the procedure was aimed at 
achieving this). In three cases (8.33% of the cases) the litigants and the 
persons under custodianship requested that the action be dismissed (or 
the termination of the custodianship should be ordered by the court) in 
order to keep their property for their own purposes. These issues also 
arose when the persons concerned did not possess significant property. 
In five cases (13.9% of the cases) the justification for ordering custodi-
anship was cited as the defense of the incomes of the litigant (or the 
person under custodianship) (Fig. 6). 
The institutional interest, that of appropriate care for persons who are 
in the care of a residential social care institution, appeared in the 
judgments, but only as a minor issue. The exercise of institutional power, 
the need for residential care as one of the reasons for ordering or 
maintaining custodianship, can be observed in seven cases (19.7% of the 
cases). The reason for this relatively modest significance can be attrib-
uted to the regulation on the publication of the judgments. Since the 
number of the appeals is relatively low in the field of custodianship 
litigation, the practice of the Hungarian higher courts (the Court of 
Appeals and the Curia) diverges in part from the practice of the first 
instance (district) courts. 
It can be stated that the protection of society, the communities and the 
interests of the authorities and public bodies are given significant emphasis – 
partly directly, partly indirectly – by the judgments, rather than consid-
eration of the protection of the interests of persons with an intellectual 
or psychosocial disability. This can be observed in the previous research 
studies conducted by Verdes and Tóth: an important issue of these 
procedures is to serve the interests of the welfare system (Verdes & Tóth, 
2010). 
In Hungary, there is a possibility of exclusion from the right to vote 
because of the person's limited legal capacity. This regulation does not 
comply with the rules of the CRPD, but the judicial practice has been 
changed in the last decade. An important element of these procedures is 
that this exclusion should be justified independently by the judges, and 
may not constitute part of the general justification for custodianship 
(Gurbai, 2012). 
Several patterns can be observed by analysis of the judgments related 
to exclusion from the right to vote. Firstly, if the court changes the re-
striction of the passive legal capacity from one of full limitation of ca-
pacity to act or from custodianship precluding legal capacity to one of 
partial limitation of capacity to act, exclusion from the right to vote is 
typically waived by the courts. The ability to exercise the right to vote 
shall be examined separately by the courts. Judicial practice has varied. 
The courts related the ability to exercise the right to vote to the basic 
knowledge of the individual concerned. Another type of testing was used 
by other courts, which focused on the person's awareness of public af-
fairs in everyday life. Thus, the restrictions were used by the courts as an 
ultima ratio tool in these cases. This awareness of public affairs in 
everyday life has become a major testing criterion in judicial practice 
over the last decade. The rights to vote and to initiate proceedings were 
not restricted – although even the right to capacity in property issues 
was restricted – if it was stated by the court that the person has 
awareness of public affairs in everyday life. The decision on these rights 
did not represent an issue in several judgments. 
The regulation has been modified during the last decade. Formerly 
the right to vote was automatically excluded by a judgement on the 
restriction of active legal capacity. It is now stated in paragraph 1 of 
Article 13/A of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Election Procedure that the courts 
should decide separately on exclusion from the right to vote, and it 
should not be directly linked to judgments on the restriction of active 
legal capacity. After the transformation of the regulation, sixteen judg-
ments were decided by the courts. In nine cases, the right to vote was not 
excluded by the judgments, while in three cases the right to vote was 
excluded by every (first instance, second instance, review decision) 
judgement. Fig. 7 
The last decisions were made in 2018. The judgments of the lower 
courts were overturned by the Curia (in two cases) and by the regional 
courts (in two cases), and the cases of exclusion from the right to vote – 
ordered by the lower courts – were terminated. 
These results can be interpreted differently. First of all, the restraint 
of lower courts – related to the exclusion from the right to vote – is 
positive and the relative activity of higher courts in reducing restrictions 
on the right to apply also represents a progressive change. However, it 
would only be compatible with the CRPD if the right to vote were never 
restricted on account of the person's disability and if the courts consis-
tently enforced the fundamental right that persons with disabilities are 
also members of the political community and should have the right to 
vote. 
4.4. Who are the ‘concerned people’ that we have discussed? 
It can be stated that in 27% of the studied judgments, the custodi-
anship lawsuit (with the purpose of modification, and annulment) was 
initiated by the person under custodianship, that is, usually the adult 
with a psychosocial or intellectual disability. It can be presumed from 
the point of view of those under custodianship that with the lawsuit that 
they initiated they wished to shift in a less restrictive direction. They 
wished to reduce the exclusion of legal capacity, with its fully or partly 
restrictive nature, and ‘win’ wider freedom for themselves, or in certain 
Fig. 6. Property issued in cases on custodianship (publicised by the CCD) 
(Source: Collection of Court Decisions – Bírósági Határozatok Gyűjteménye, 
BHGY, https://birosag.hu/birosagi-hatarozatok-gyujtemenye – edited by 
the authors.) 
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cases fully free themselves from previous restrictions by terminating the 
effect of custodianship. Their substantive aim, therefore, is to ‘win back’ 
wider decision-making autonomy, and more extensive right to self- 
determination in their lives. 18.9% of the cases aimed to terminate 
custodianship partially limiting legal capacity, and 8.1% to terminate 
conservatorship (when a guardian or a protector is appointed to manage 
the financial affairs or daily life of another person) fully limiting 
custodianship. 
Although there has been some shift in legal regulation in Hungary to 
facilitate the access of the concerned people to justice (for example, the 
summons and the handout delivered during the lawsuit have to be 
adapted to the mental condition of the individual, and there is an op-
portunity for the requisition and the presence of a supporting party 
among others, besides which if, during a civil action, the concerned 
person submits a request for a supporting party prior to the lawsuit). 
However, these are far from being changed to such an extent that they 
would result in a mass initiation of lawsuits to shift in a less restrictive 
direction. 
Briefly, we have the following information about the lifestyles of the 
concerned people: in 67.5% of the examined judgments, the individuals 
that we have studied are not placed in institutions (this may be related to 
the fact that in terms of enforcement – since all legal remedy forums 
were employed in these cases – the group under custodianship with the 
worst situation and status was not the focus of our study). At the same 
time, however, it is worth noting that almost 50% receive psychiatric 
treatment. It can be somewhat explained, with regard to the above, that 
‘only’ some 30% of the people concerned in this case file live in per-
manent residential institutions, and more than a third of the latter do not 
receive psychiatric treatment or refuse it. 
Based on the available data on these judgments, it can be observed 
that the most common reason for placing an individual under custodi-
anship on the grounds of a psychiatric opinion is that the individual has 
either paranoid personality disorder or paranoid schizophrenia. 
5. Final remarks 
In our analysis of publicly available custodianship cases, we drew the 
following conclusions regarding the research questions. The shift in 
paradigm envisaged by the CRPD is not sufficiently reflected in pub-
lished case law. It is clear from the reasoning of the courts that they do 
not view supported decision-making as a realistic alternative to custo-
dianship. The courts formally follow the system of case category re-
striction as prescribed by the new Civil Code in all cases, but sometimes 
they revert to the old ways, and the categories are so extensive that they 
cover almost all aspects of life, resulting in the same degree of general 
limitation as was available and preferred under the old Civil Code. At the 
same time, the Curia's guidelines also seek to encourage a reflected 
application of the legal institution and prevent the hidden survival of the 
previous general limitation. However, it is doubtful whether the Curia 
alone can achieve a substantial change of attitude in the jurisdiction of 
the lower courts on the basis of the regulations in force (Fiala-Butora, 
2019, p. 9). 
In the majority of cases, the higher courts upheld both the first 
instance decision and, at least indirectly, accepted the expert opinion 
upon which it was based. Together with previous research findings, 
besides the relatively short duration of cases and the length of reasoning 
of the judgments, these findings suggest that court proceedings do not 
provide substantive legal protection for those concerned. We attempt to 
verify this finding with qualitative studies at a later stage of the research. 
Examination of the published judgments confirmed our hypothesis 
that the declared goal of the legal institution of custodianship, that of the 
protection of the rights of the concerned person, is usually not the only 
one and sometimes not even the main function of limitation of legal 
capacity in the practice. Property issues played an important role in a 
significant number of the cases we examined, and in only 21.6% of the 
cases did they not appear. In these cases, the protection of the property 
of the person concerned was intertwined with the property interests of 
family members and the disposition of income with the material in-
terests of those living in the same household. In 10.8% of the cases, those 
affected complained that being placed under custodianship prevented 
them from enjoying their property and income freely. In addition, in the 
published cases, the interests of the authorities were protected relatively 
often by restricting the opportunity for persons with ‘litigation madness’ 
to initiate proceedings. 
However, in addition to the main findings outlined above, we have, 
most importantly, identified an urgent need for custodianship author-
ities and courts to provide significantly more data on custodianship 
proceedings in the form of publicly available statistics and anonymized 
judgments. This would ensure that the institutions of supported and 
surrogate decision-making, which are of paramount importance with 
regard to fundamental rights, operate in a transparent manner. 
As we have mentioned, the research is based on the publicly avail-
able decisions of the Hungarian higher tier courts, thus only the practice 
of these higher fora are analyzed by our paper. However, it is an analysis 
of a higher court practice of a small Eastern Central European country, 
but it can be interesting for a broader community. Hungary has a con-
tinental (civil law) legal system, and the Democratic Transition of 
Hungary started around 30 years ago. The restricted influence of the 
Fig. 7. Right to vote in in cases on custodianship (publicised by the CCD) (Source: Collection of Court Decisions – Bírósági Határozatok Gyűjteménye, BHGY, htt 
ps://birosag.hu/birosagi-hatarozatok-gyujtemenye – edited by the authors.) 
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international human rights legislation and the democratic patterns can 
be observed by the analysis of this judicial practice: how the actual 
practice has not been transformed by the amended - human rights based 
- legislation. 
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